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The multinationalization of corporate investment in recent years has given rise to a number of 
international tax avoidance schemes that may be eroding tax revenues in industrialized 
countries, but which may also reduce tax burdens on mobile capital and so facilitate 
investment. Both the welfare effects of and the optimal response to international tax planning 
are therefore ambiguous. Evaluating these factors in a simple general equilibrium model, we 
find that citizens of high-tax countries benefit from (some) tax planning. Paradoxically, if tax 
rates are not too high, an increase in tax planning activity causes a rise in optimal corporate 
tax rates, and a decline in multinational investment. Thus fears of a “race to the bottom” in 
corporate tax rates may be misplaced. 
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In recent years, the process of globalization has brought nations closer to-
gether and, apparently, increased the international mobility of corporate
activity. Two aspects of globalization have had important and conceptu-
ally distinct implications: reductions in transportation and communication
costs may make real business investment more mobile across jurisdictional
boundaries, and ﬁnancial innovation and liberalization may facilitate inter-
national tax avoidance by less footloose ﬁrms. In this paper, we argue that
these two aspects of globalization can have very different implications for
the welfare of citizens and for the appropriate policy response by govern-
ments.
Increased mobility of goods and services is apt to give rise to an erosion
of corporate tax bases in high-tax industrialized countries, a decline in tax
revenues and a rise in competition among governments. Countries seeking
to attract and retain mobile investment and the associated tax revenues may
be induced to reduce tax rates below the levels that would obtain in the
absence of mobility. In the view of some commentators, indeed, increased
mobility can lead to a “race to the bottom” driving business tax rates to
minimal levels, due to the ﬁscal externalities that mobility creates. These
arguments notwithstanding, there appears to be very little evidence of a
general decline in effective tax rates on capital in recent years (Slemrod,
2004).
Financial mobility is manifested in the decisions of multinational enter-
prises to separate research and development and capital ﬁnancing activities
from production and sales of outputs, and so to engage in “tax planning”
to realize income from intellectual property and from capital in jurisdic-
tions different from those where real economic activities are located. The
implications of ﬁnancial mobility are more subtle: When ﬁrms may shift in-
come to tax havens and other low-tax jurisdictions through ﬁnancial trans-
actions, real investment choices of ﬁrms and the tax policy environment of
governments are changed. Tax planning tends to make the location of real
investment less responsive to tax rate differentials, even as taxable income
becomes more elastic. While tax planning may reduce revenues of high-
tax jurisdictions, therefore, it may have offsetting effects on real investment
that are attractive to governments. In principle, then, the presence of in-
ternational tax planning opportunities may allow countries to maintain or
even increase high business tax rates, while preventing an outﬂow of foreign
direct investment.
In this paper, we offer a simple model of these competing effects of in-
1ternational tax planning on the mobility of business tax bases and business
investment. We argue that the investment-enhancing effects of international
tax planning can dominate the revenue-erosion effects. The implications of
this view are strong: an increase in international tax avoidance can lead to
an increase in both statutory and effective tax rates on capital, if initial tax
rates are not too high, and an increase in the welfare of citizens of high-tax
countries.
Our results therefore offer a new perspective on the recent debate over
legal responses to international tax planning in the US and elsewhere. Com-
menting on revelations of Microsoft’s tax planning practices in Europe, a
recent New York Times editorial asserted “outsourcing is extending itself
[from manufacturing employment] to taxes, in large part because the United
States Congress has given business the loopholes to do it.”1 But, consistent
with our model, governments may be reluctant to close such “loopholes,”
because of fears of losses in multinational employment and, in particular,
expatriations of ownership and headquarters operations to low-tax coun-
tries.2
Early empirical research is suggestive of the role of international tax
planning on both revenues and investment. Hines and Rice (1994) ﬁnd a
negative relationship between tax rates of host countries and measures of
the proﬁtability of afﬁliates of US multinationals. Likewise, Mintz and Smart
(2004) ﬁnd evidence of greater tax base mobility among ﬁrms organized
to take advantage of tax planning opportunities; however, the same ﬁrms
exhibit greater mobility in the location of their assets as well. More recently,
Desai et al. (2004b) have shown that US multinationals with an afﬁliate in
a tax haven also invest more in neighboring non-haven countries, which is
suggestive of the mitigating effect of tax planning on investment.
The starting point for an analysis of the effects of income shifting must
be an understanding of the role of a source-based corporate income tax in
a world of mobile capital. In the standard analysis, governments in small,
open economies should eschew taxes on mobile factors like international
capital, since they are distortionary and will ultimately be borne by im-
mobile domestic factors anyway (Gordon, 1986; Bucovetsky and Wilson,
1991). In our perspective, governments may nevertheless rely on corpo-
rate income taxes as a device for redistributing rents from domestic en-
1New York Times, November 17, 2005, p. A30.
2For example, in 2002, a senior Congressional aide justiﬁed proposals to reform taxation
of offshore income by “the need to make tax policy changes so that US businesses are no
longer attractive takeover targets.” Quoted in Collins and Shackelford (2003).
2trepreneurs to workers, despite the distortionary effects on investment.34
This view of the corporate tax has rather stark implications for the effects
of multinational tax avoidance. Since the burden of multinational taxes
is ultimately borne by domestic agents anyway, revenue losses due to tax
planning are irrelevant, and what matters is the effect of tax planning on the
level of multinational investment in high-tax countries and its deadweight
costs for the economy, if any. Indeed, we show that an increase in income
shifting causes the effective tax rate on capital to rise rather than fall, if the
initial statutory tax rate is no greater than 50 per cent. According to recent
OECD statistics, combined corporate and personal tax rates on equity capital
in G7 countries range between 45 and 64 per cent, with a median value of
52 per cent. In loose terms, then, our theory predicts tax rates to remain
roughly stable at current levels in response to the rise of tax havens, rather
than to decline as in the standard view.
Our paper contributes to a growing theoretical literature on the relation-
ship between tax planning and investment locations, and its implications for
tax policies. Grubert and Slemrod (1998) point out that income shifting and
real business location decisions of multinational ﬁrms may be interlinked in
complex ways, and their theoretical model is the point of departure for our
research. Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000) observe that income shifting may
induce governments to eliminate investment allowances to offset revenue
losses, and so cause effective tax rates on capital to rise. Mintz and Smart
(2004) point out that international tax planning may have positive effects
on real investment that can offset the negative consequences of lost revenue.
In their model, unlike ours, governments in high-tax countries nevertheless
prefer to eliminate tax planning loopholes and reduce statutory corporate
tax rates in order to achieve the same level of inward investment at a lower
aggregate deadweight cost to the economy. Bucovetsky and Hauﬂer (2005)
also consider a model of income shifting and investment by multinationals.
They examine the implications of tax sheltering for the decisions of ﬁrms to
use multinational organizational structures, and for the potential for inter-
national tax cooperation.
Since the ﬁrst version of our paper appeared, Slemrod and Wilson (2006)
have also studied tax competition in the presence of income shifting in a re-
3Related, Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995) observe that the corporation income tax
serves to reduce domestic shifting between personal and corporate tax bases. But their
analysis ignores capital.
4Of course, the corporate tax also has an indirect inﬂuence on redistribution through its
effects on equilibrium wages in the economy, and our ﬁrst result establishes conditions under
which the optimal corporate tax rate is positive in a small, open economy.
3lated theoretical framework. They conclude that the presence of income
shifting to tax havens reduces welfare in high-tax countries, precisely con-
trary to our main result. We provide a fuller description of their work below
and attempt to account for the differences in results.
Section 2 lays out a two-sector general equilibrium model of corporate
income taxation in a small, open economy. In this environment, corporate
taxes can have desirable effects on the extent of income redistribution be-
tween domestic capitalists and domestic workers, but have deleterious ef-
fects on the level of foreign direct investment and on domestic wages. We
establish necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the ﬁrst effect to dominate,
so that an optimizing government chooses a positive tax rate. In Section
3, we introduce international tax avoidance, in the form of intra-corporate
borrowing between the afﬁliate in the high-tax host country and an afﬁliate
in a tax haven. We consider the effects of tax avoidance on the optimal tax
policy of the host country and the welfare of its workers and capitalists. Sec-
tion 4 introduces deadweight costs of tax planning activity and considers the
case for thin capitalization rules that limit the extent of tax planning. Sec-
tion 5 concludes with a comparison of our results with Slemrod and Wilson
(2006) and a discussion of the implications for public policy.
2 International taxation and domestic redistribution
2.1 The model
Initially we study the effects of international taxation in the absence of in-
come shifting. Our goal is to understand why governments may levy a
source-based corporation income tax even in a small, open economy that
earns no rents from the use of multinational capital stocks.
Consider therefore an economy consisting of two classes of consumers—
workers and entrepreneurs—and a single, homogeneous consumption good
that can be produced with either of two technologies. The ﬁrst, available
in what we label the multinational sector, produces output using domestic
labour Lm and imported capital K according to a strictly concave, constant-




The second technology, owned by entrepreneurs in the domestic sector, em-
ploys labour Ld and domestic entrepreneurial capital D to produce output
G(Ld,D), where G is a strictly concave, constant-returns function.
4Labour is immobile internationally but mobile between domestic and
multinational sectors and earns wage rate w. The aggregate labour endow-
ment of workers in the domestic economy is inelastically supplied, and we
normalize it to one. The supply of domestic entrepreneurial capital D is
likewise ﬁxed, so that the entrepreneurial class (who supply no labour) con-
sume the rents accruing in the domestic sector after payment of taxes.
Capital K used in the multinational sector is ﬁnanced through equity
injections from offshore parents, which in turn hire capital in the world
market at ﬁxed rental price r. That is, the economy is a small, open economy.
The output of the two sectors may be absorbed domestically or exported at
a ﬁxed world price, normalized to one. Government levies a “classical”
corporate income tax on the two sectors; that is, the tax base is ﬁrms’ gross
revenues less wage payments, and dividends remitted by multinationals to
their parents are not deductible. Given the corporate tax rate t, ﬁrms in the
multinational sector therefore maximize after-tax proﬁt
(1− t)(F(Lm,K) − wLm) − rK





FL(Lm,K) = w (2)
To simplify subsequent notation, let ρ = r/(1 − t) denote the after-tax user
cost of capital in the multinational sector, given by (1). Since capital is not
employed in the domestic sector, the corporate tax there acts as a (lump-
sum) tax on entrepreneurial rents
π(w) = max
Ld
G(Ld,D) − wLd (3)
(where we suppress the dependence of π on the ﬁxed entrepreneurial cap-
ital stock D), and labour demand in the domestic sector satisﬁes the ﬁrst-
order condition
G0(Ld,D) = w (4)
Given t and the optimizing decisions of ﬁrms, corporate tax revenues
may be calculated as
T = t(F(Lm,K) − wLm) + t(G(Ld,D) − wLd)
= (ρ − r)K(w,ρ) + tπ(w)
(5)
5where we have used (3) and the zero-proﬁt condition of multinational ﬁrms
F − wLm = ρK.
Let w(ρ) be the wage rate that clears the domestic labour market
Lm(w,ρ) + Ld(w,D) = 1 (6)
where Ld and Lm are the derived proﬁt-maximizing demands satisfying (1)–
(4). Applying the implicit function theorem to (6) shows that dw/dρ ≡
w0
ρ < 0: an increase in the user cost of capital induces a decline in the
equilibrium wage rate, since (a fortiori) capital and labour are complements
in the multinational sector.
A key simplifying assumption of our model is that the tax authority can-
not observe the investment level of an individual ﬁrm, nor whether it is of
the domestic or multinational type—and so is constrained to impose the
same tax rate on all ﬁrms. In the sequel, income shifting by multinational
ﬁrms will therefore create a wedge in the effective tax rates on capital paid
by the two types of ﬁrms. Naturally, this role for income shifting would be
attenuated, but not eliminated, if authorities could imperfectly observe the
type of individual ﬁrms and hence their degree of international mobility, and
customize their tax policies accordingly.
2.2 Optimal tax policy
Let us suppose that government seeks to redistribute income from the en-
trepreneurial class to the worker class, and that revenues from taxing both
domestic and multinational ﬁrms are simply paid to workers as a lump
sum. To capture the redistributive motive in a simple way, we suppose that
government places a parametric value β ≤ 1 on the consumption of en-
trepreneurs, relative to the consumption of workers. The objective function
of the government is therefore Ω = CW + βCE, where
CW = w + T (7)
CE = (1− t)π(w) (8)
are consumption levels of workers and entrepreneurs, and T is corporate
tax revenues. More convenient for our purposes, deﬁne
Y = F(Lm,K) − rK + G(Ld,D) (9)
6as gross national product, and note that the material balance condition5 for
the economy CW + CE = Y allows us to write the government’s problem as
max
t≤1
Y(w,ρ) − (1− β)CE(t,w)
subject to ρ =
r
1− t
and Lm(w,ρ) + Ld(w,D) = 1
That is, government in this economy seeks to maximize GNP minus a frac-
tion (1− β) of net-of-tax proﬁts that accrue to entrepreneurs. This formula-
tion illustrates in a particularly stark way the equity–efﬁciency tradeoff that
is at the heart of our model: the only means of redistribution from domes-
tic entrepreneurs to domestic workers is the corporate tax, which distorts
inward FDI and causes GNP to fall below its maximal level.









The left-hand side of this expression is the marginal deadweight loss of the
tax, which is equated to its marginal redistributive beneﬁt at the optimum.
The marginal deadweight loss can be computed by totally differentiating (9)
with respect to t and using (1), (2) and (4) to obtain
dY
dt
= (ρ − r)
∂K
∂ρ
and (10) can then be rearranged to obtain a typical inverse-elasticity ex-
pression for the optimal tax rate:
t∗








where eK = −ρK0
ρ/K is the elasticity of capital demand with respect to its
user cost.
To understand the implications of (11), it is useful ﬁrst to consider a
number of special cases. First, observe that, if there were no domestic sector
(CE ≡ 0) then the optimal corporate tax rate would be zero. This replicates
5The material balance condition for this economy is merely Walras’s law, and can be
veriﬁed from (5)–(8) and the zero-proﬁt condition for multinational ﬁrms.
7the standard result that a small open economy prefers taxes on domestic
factors to taxes on imported capital. Second, if the government did not wish
to redistribute from entrepreneurs to workers (β = 1) then the optimal
corporate tax rate would again be zero. Without the redistribution motive,
there is again no reason to tax or subsidize capital, since this would merely
distort the multinational investment decision and labour market as well,
as taxes on imported capital were shifted backward to domestic workers.
Third, the optimal tax rate approaches to zero as the user-cost elasticity of
international capital demand eK becomes large, so that the excess burden of
the corporate tax becomes prohibitive.
Thus in our model the optimal corporate tax rate in a small, open econ-
omy is not zero, but it may in principle be either positive or negative. Equa-
tion (11) shows that the sign of t∗ is the same as the sign of the redistributive





= π − ρLd
dw
dρ
The ﬁrst term measures the direct redistributive effect of taxing entrepreneurial
proﬁts and transferring the revenues to workers. The second is the indi-
rect or general-equilibrium redistributive effect of the corporate tax, result-
ing from its deterrence of foreign direct investment, which decreases the
wage and increases pre-tax entrepreneurial proﬁts. Thus redistribution via
a corporate tax occurs both post-ﬁsc, through the transfer of revenues, and
pre-ﬁsc, through the effect on wages, and the two effects are offsetting.
Put differently, the government in this small, open economy prefers greater
multinational investment for its effect in enhancing domestic wages, and it
recognizes that taxes on capital are ultimately incident on domestic workers
rather than the owners of capital. The government may nevertheless tax
corporate incomes in order to redistribute from domestic entrepreneurs to
domestic workers.
In principle, if the indirect effect of the corporate tax dominates the
direct effect, then the optimal corporate tax rate is negative: foreign direct
investment should be subsidized to raise wages, even at the expense of the
resulting transfers to domestic entrepreneurs. To determine which effect




























That is, our model implies:
Proposition 1 The optimal corporate income tax rate is positive if and only if,
evaluated at the optimum point, output per worker is greater in the domestic
sector than in the multinational sector.
The proposition gives a (local) necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the
direct effect on redistribution to outweigh the indirect effect, and so for
the optimal corporate tax rate to be positive at the optimum in the model.
The condition is intuitive: when the multinational sector is relatively labour
intensive, capital market distortions are of relatively little importance to
labour demand, and redistribution is better achieved through the ﬁsc than
by subsidizing capital. As a loose heuristic, the condition says that interna-
tional call centres are an appropriate target for host country taxation, while
international ﬁnancial centres should be subsidized.
Indirect redistributive effects in this model are particularly strong be-
cause of our assumption that the outputs of domestic and multinational
sectors are perfect substitutes in consumption. A more realistic framework
would allow for imperfect substitutability, which would attenuate the in-
direct effect and allow scope for positive corporate taxation even if labour
intensities were (somewhat) reversed. For our purposes, however, it will
sufﬁce to assume that the condition of Proposition 1 holds at the optimum,
so that t∗ > 0 in the absence of international tax planning. We now proceed
to analyze how optimal tax policies change when multinational ﬁrms may
shift offshore income earned domestically and so escape some portion of
domestic tax liabilities.
3 Optimal taxation with international tax planning
To incorporate international tax avoidance behaviour in a simple way, we
simply posit that each multinational ﬁrm has an afﬁliate located in a “tax
haven” jurisdiction, and the ﬁrm may ﬁnance investment in the (high-tax)
host country through a loan from the haven afﬁliate, rather than a direct
equity injection from the parent. Since the host country operates a clas-
sical corporation income tax, interest payments to the haven afﬁliate are
9deductible from host country taxable income. We assume that the haven
imposes no taxes at all on income remitted there, though none of our quali-
tative results would change if the haven levied some positive but lower tax
rate than the host country.6
Since the interest payment to the haven afﬁliate is rB, the ﬁrm’s after-tax
proﬁt is therefore
Π = (1− t)(F − wL) − rK + trB
That is, the possibility of lending between afﬁliates facing different tax
rates creates an unlimited tax arbitrage opportunity. More realistically, even
related-party borrowing creates deadweight costs for the ﬁrm and its out-
side investors, which reﬂect the transactions costs of these strategies, the
potential for afﬁliate default, and the agency problems associated with the
complex ﬁnancial structures that international tax planning entails (“Par-
malat costs”).7 Such costs serve as a brake on international tax planning
and, to capture this in a simple way, we simply assume for now that the
ﬁrm is constrained not to issue debt to the haven afﬁliate in excess of an
exogenous debt-capital ration b: the B ≤ bK. We return to an analysis of
agency costs below in Section 4.
Since the debt constraint will bind at the optimum, we may substitute it
into the proﬁt function to obtain
Π(Lm,K) = (1− t)







Proﬁt-maximizing input demands therefore again satisfy FL = w and FK = ρ





while the domestic sector’s labour demand is still characterized by G0(Ld,D) =
w.
6More restrictive is our assumption that the haven’s tax rate is exogenous, and indepen-
dent of the degree of multinational income shifting that takes place. That is, we study the
optimal tax policies of a single high-tax country, rather than a tax-competition game among
countries. However, Janeba and Peters (1999) and Marceau et al. (2006) study the emer-
gence of tax havens in a two sector model of tax competition that has some similarity to our
environment. They show that even small differences in technologies between countries can
lead to large differences in equilibrium tax rates on mobile tax bases.
7Desai et al. (2004a) provide a discussion of such costs and the effects of international
tax planning in Russia.
10The consequence of tax planning is to reduce the host country’s tax rev-









and so at a ﬁxed tax rate to reduce the consumption of domestic workers.
However, this ignores the optimal response in tax policies to income shifting,
which we turn to next.
To study optimal policy, it is more convenient to formulate the problem
as one of choosing an effective tax rate on capital ρ − r, rather than a statu-
tory rate t. Accordingly, deﬁne the statutory tax rate associated with any
user cost of capital by
t = g(ρ,b) ≡
ρ − r
ρ − rb
⇐⇒ ρ = ρ(t,b)
Observe that g is increasing in (ρ,b). In the presence of income shifting,
then, the host government’s optimal tax policies solve:8
Ω∗(b) = max
ρ
Y(w,ρ) − (1− β)CE(t,w)
subject to t = g(ρ,b)
Lm(w,ρ) + Ld(w,D) = 1














which can be inverted to obtain an optimal tax formula analogous to (11)
for the no-shifting case.9
8Given constant returns to scale in the multinational sector, and using (6)–(8) and (15),
the material balance condition for the economy is again CW + CE = Y = F − rK + G, and
the government’s objective can be written as Y − (1− β)CE.

















where t∗ is the optimal tax rate in the no-shifting case. Since t∗ ≤ 1, the second term is
non-negative, and the sufﬁcient condition of Proposition 1 for a positive optimal tax rate is
sufﬁcient in the case with international tax planning as well.
11Our ﬁrst substantive result concerns the effect of income shifting on the













The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of this expression is the impact of in-
come shifting on pre-ﬁsc income inequality. As before, the tax on multina-
tional capital depresses wages and redistributes to entrepreneurs, but in-
come shifting permits an increase in the statutory tax rate (∂g/∂b > 0),
which mitigates the effect of lower wages on an after-tax basis. The sec-
ond term is the impact of income shifting on the capital distortion caused
by increases in the statutory tax rate. In the appendix we show this term is
positive (∂2g/∂ρ∂b ≥ 0) if and only if the initial tax rate is no greater than
50 per cent. Thus we have:
Proposition 2 An increase in international tax planning b causes an increase
in the optimal marginal effective tax rate on capital ρ∗ − r, and a decline in

















we may immediately establish:
Proposition 3 An increase in international tax planning b causes an increase
in the statutory tax rate t∗ if t∗ ≤ 1/2.
Our results suggest a new view of international tax planning and its ef-
fects on high-tax countries. The standard view is that the rise in income
shifting may lead to an erosion in corporate tax revenues, and a decline
in statutory rates as high-tax countries compete to protect tax bases, with
a consequent decline in consumer welfare. However, while multinational
corporate tax revenues decline with greater ease of income shifting, this is
without direct consequence for consumers in a small, open economy, since
the burden of such taxes is shifted to other agents in any case. The indirect








Figure 1: The effect of income shifting on the optimal allocation
and so an opportunity to increase statutory rates with reducing foreign in-
vestment. Proposition 3 shows that statutory rates will indeed increase, if
the initial rate is not too high. More surprising perhaps, Proposition 2 im-
plies that under the same conditions it is optimal to increase the statutory
rate so much that the increase more than offsets the effect of income shift-
ing, the effective tax on foreign capital rises, and investment declines in
consequence.
Figure 1 illustrates the result in consumption space. To do so, deﬁne
the utility possibility frontier for this economy given the extent of income
shifting b by the set
F(b) = {(CE,CW) ∈ R2
+ : ∃t such that CE=C∗
E(t,b) and CW =C∗
W(t,b)}
where the consumption levels of the two classes of agents are given by the
individual budget constraints (7)–(8), given the equilibrium wage w(ρ).
Figure 1 depicts the utility possibility frontier for two different values of
b. The curve labeled E0F is the utility possibility frontier for some initial
degree of income shifting b0. The point F, where the slope of the UPF is −1,
corresponds to a statutory tax rate of zero; the point E0, where the slope
of the UPF is −β, is the optimal allocation, corresponding to some positive
13statutory tax rate t∗
0 under the conditions of Proposition 1. Now consider
an increase in feasible income shifting to b1 > b0, and suppose that the
host government responds by holding the user cost of capital constant at ρ∗
0.
Then GNP and the pre-tax wage would remain unchanged, but t would rise
to keep ρ constant, so that CE would fall and CW would rise. Consequently,
the UPF for b1 includes a feasible point that lies to the northeast of E0. As
well, point F lies on the new UPF, since b is irrelevant to the allocation when
t = 0. Consequently, an increase in b causes the UPF to shift outward to the
left of F, to a curve such as the one labeled E1F.
Thus CW must increase with b, as illustrated in Figure 1. This result
is based on revealed-preference considerations alone, and so it does not
depend on the particular welfare function we assume, nor the technologies
of ﬁrms. But worker consumption may increase through a decline in the
user cost of foreign capital and an increase in domestic wages, or through
an increase on rents transferred from domestic entrepreneurs through the
statutory tax rate, or both. Which of these occurs in response to an increase
in b depends on the speciﬁcs of the model, as shown in Proposition 2.
It is also apparent from Figure 1 that domestic social welfare Ω must








since ∂g/∂b > 0. Thus we have:
Proposition 4 An increase in international tax planning b causes social wel-
fare to rise in a high-tax country.
The result suggests that high-tax governments may rationally be reluc-
tant to take steps to combat international tax planning. In view of Proposi-
tion 4, tax planning by multinational ﬁrms is an unmitigated boon to high-
tax countries, and no restrictions are warranted. But our analysis thus far
has ignored the deadweight costs of tax planning—the subject of the next
section, which offers a more nuanced view of restrictions on tax planning.
Since the effect of income shifting in our model is to reduce the ex-
cess burden of redistributive taxation, it might be expected that its effect
is a Pareto improvement for citizens of the host country, and not merely
a welfare gain. But this is not the case: To see the effect of shifting on
the consumption of domestic entrepreneurs, totally differentiate C∗
E(t,b) ≡









14Since Proposition 1 implies ∂C∗
E/∂t < 0 for t∗ > 0, ∂ρ/∂b < 0, and Proposi-
tion 3 implies ∂t∗/∂b > 0 if t∗ ≤ 1/2, we have:
Proposition 5 An increase in international tax planning b causes the utility
of domestic entrepreneurs to fall if 0 ≤ t∗ ≤ 1/2.
4 Restrictions on tax planning
The analysis of the preceding section interprets international tax planning
as an exogenous inﬂuence on the tax policy of governments, and parameter-
izes the effect by the fraction of multinational proﬁts that can be shifted to
havens through related-party borrowing. Underlying the model is the notion
that managers and shareholders themselves prefer to limit income shifting,
because of the agency and other deadweight costs it imposes on the ﬁrm.
In this section, we introduce an explicit (though very simple) model of the
deadweight costs of tax planning, and we ask whether governments in high-
tax countries prefer to restrict such activities beyond the natural restraints
deadweight costs place on the ﬁrms themselves.
In fact, governments in high-tax countries do attempt to control multi-
national ﬁnancing structures through a variety of means. A number of coun-
tries in particular impose thin capitalization rules on foreign-controlled cor-
porate taxpayers, which limit the deductibility of interest and so the extent
of income shifting through debt.Our chief result in this section therefore
characterizes the optimal thin capitalization rule from the perspective of a
high-tax country.
The model is the same as in Section 3, except that borrowing B from
the haven afﬁliate entails real deadweight costs C(B,K). Assume that C is
differentiable, increasing and convex in B, and linear-homogeneous in its
arguments. Accordingly, let C(B,K) = c(rb)K, where b = B/K is the debt-
capital ratio, and c(rb) is the cost per unit of capital owned by the afﬁliate
in the high-tax country. Assume moreover that c(0) = c0(0) = 0: informally,
the deadweight cost of the ﬁrst dollar of income shifted is arbitrarily small.
The ﬁrm chooses b and K to maximize after-tax proﬁts net of shifting
costs, given by
(1− t)[F(Lm,K) − wLm] − [r(1− tb) − c(rb)]K (17)
Maximizing (17) with respect to b, in the absence of thin capitalization rules,
the optimal debt-capital ratio of the ﬁrm therefore satisﬁes
t = c0(rb∗) (18)
15since the tax arbitrage beneﬁt of borrowing is equated to its marginal cost
at the optimum. Observe that b∗ is increasing in t, since c0 is increasing.
The ﬁrm’s factor demands satisfy the usual conditions FK = ρ and FL = w,
where now the user cost of capital is
ρ(t,b) =
r(1− tb) + c(rb)
1− t
(19)
Consider now a thin capitalization restriction on the high-tax afﬁliate’s
deductible interest expenses as a proportion of capital:
rB ≤ γK
for some γ ∈ [0,1]. To focus on the interesting case, assume that γ ≤ rb∗,
so the limit is binding at the ﬁrm’s optimum.
The host government now has two policy instruments, the effective tax
rate on capital ρ − r and the limit on interest deductions γ. The govern-
ment’s objective function is now
Ω(ρ,t,γ) = Y(w,ρ) − (1− β)CE(t,w) − c(γ)K
since GNP is net of the deadweight costs of shifting; and (ρ,t,γ) are to be
chosen to maximize Ω subject to (19) and the equilibrium conditions for the
economy.
Let t = g(ρ,γ) denote the inverse tax function for (19). The optimal
thin capitalization rule γ∗ satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
Ω0
γ = (1− β)π
∂g(ρ∗,γ∗)
∂γ
− c0(γ∗)K = 0 (20)
together with the condition analogous to (16) for ρ∗. Observe from (20) that
the impact of the thin capitalization rule can be decomposed into its effect
on domestic redistribution (the ﬁrst term) and on deadweight costs (the
second term). The ﬁrst effect is positive, since g0
γ > 0—facilitating income
shifting permits an increase in the statutory tax rate and so in domestic
redistribution—while the second is negative. Under our assumptions, we
may demonstrate that the optimal thin capitalization rule is interior: In the
presence of deadweight costs, some tax planning is desirable, but so are
some restrictions on it:
Proposition 6 The socially optimal degree of tax planning is positive but less
than that preferred by multinational ﬁrms: 0 < γ∗ < rb∗.
Proof. See appendix.
165 Conclusion
Our results suggest a new view of the role of tax havens in international
competition for business tax bases. While income shifting to tax havens
may reduce revenues of high-tax jurisdictions and increase tax base elastic-
ities, it tends to make the location of real investment less responsive to tax
rate differentials. In principle, then, the presence of international tax plan-
ning opportunities may allow countries to maintain or even increase high
business tax rates, while preventing an outﬂow of foreign direct investment.
Indeed, we have shown that the investment-enhancing effects of interna-
tional tax planning can dominate the revenue-erosion effects: an increase
in international tax avoidance can lead to an increase in both statutory and
effective tax rates on capital, if initial tax rates are not too high, and an
increase in the welfare of citizens of high-tax countries.
In a recent contribution, Slemrod and Wilson (2006) also study the ef-
fects of income shifting to tax havens in a model of tax competition. As in
our work, they consider a small, open economy model of capital ﬂows, in
which a reduced-form model of international income shifting is posited; as
in our work, they introduce an interaction between the multinational capi-
tal tax base and domestic income tax bases that generates a positive tax rate
on capital in the equilibrium of the model. Despite these similarities, Slem-
rod and Wilson conclude that the presence of income shifting to tax havens
reduces welfare in high-tax countries, precisely contrary to our main result.
Given that such similar frameworks lead to such different normative con-
clusions, it is worthwhile exploring the differences between the models in
more detail. In Slemrod and Wilson, governments have access to two tax
bases, mobile capital and domestic labour, and they are free to tax either
base at any rate.10 In this setting, the standard result is that, since both
taxes are ultimately incident on domestic labour anyway, governments in
equilibrium set the tax on capital to zero, relying exclusively on labour tax-
ation to ﬁnance spending, even if labour taxes have their own distortionary
cost due to domestic tax avoidance activities. The wrinkle in Slemrod and
Wilson (2006) is that a reduced-form model of domestic tax evasion is intro-
duced. Since labour taxes can be evaded, a reduction in the after-tax wage
through labour taxation creates deadweight costs that a reduction in the pre-
tax wage through discouraging capital investment does not. Consequently,
governments prefer to rely to some extent on capital taxes in equilibrium,
10The notion that corporate income taxes are both taxes on capital and taxes on the labour
of high-income entrepreneurs, central to our analysis, is absent from their work.
17despite their wage-reducing effects.
In this context, introduction of income shifting activities is akin to an
increase in the elasticity of national tax bases in the standard model, which
Slemrod and Wilson show to intensify tax competition among countries, to
reduce equilibrium tax rates on the mobile base and public goods provision,
and so to reduce welfare for residents of high-tax countries in equilibrium.
Choice between the two models must naturally be made on the basis
of their implications about observables, rather than their normative impli-
cations. While Slemrod and Wilson do not emphasize implications of their
model that correspond closely to our main testable implications, Proposi-
tions 2 and 3, some inferences may readily be drawn. In the Slemrod-Wilson
model, introduction of tax havens must lead to a decline in equilibrium
statutory tax rates, whereas our theory predicts higher statutory rates with
shifting to havens and even higher effective tax rates on capital investment,
if statutory tax rates are no higher than 50 per cent—about the current av-
erage level of corporate and personal tax rates on equity in OECD countries.
A straightforward way to distinguish between the models, therefore, is to
determine whether the rise of income shifting has caused a reduction in ef-
fective tax rates or not. Consistent with our theory, Devereux et al. (2002)
and Slemrod (2004) have found no evidence of a decline in marginal ef-
fective tax rates on capital in OECD countries in recent years, although this
reﬂects both a decline in statutory corporate tax rates and reductions in
investment allowances. Of course, attributing any of these changes to the
causal effects of competition from havens is more difﬁcult.
Another, albeit less direct, way to distinguish between the theories is
in their implications for the desirability of restrictions on tax planning. In
the Slemrod-Wilson theory, restrictions are unambiguously welfare improv-
ing; in our theory, some degree of restriction improves welfare, but it is
never optimal to eliminate tax planning entirely. This view may therefore
rationalize those aspects of the aspects of the corporate tax systems in some
high-tax countries that appear to target tax reductions to mobile, multina-
tional ﬁrms (Bucovetsky and Hauﬂer, 2005). For example, Ireland’s low-
tax policies have made it a magnet for headquarters operations in Europe
but have drawn little policy response from the European Union, despite
the demonstrated willingness of member states to harmonize tax policies in
other areas. In the United States, concerns about expatriation of corporate
ownership to havens appear to have prompted reforms aimed at reducing
tax liabilities on worldwide income of US taxpayers. While future growth in
haven activities may bring a more concerted policy response from high-tax
countries, the case at present is far from clear.
18Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Equation (11) establishes that
t∗







where the general equilibrium decline in entrepreneurs’ consumption CE =




= π + (1− t)Ldw0
ρρ0
t = π + Ldρw0
ρ (21)
where w(ρ) is the equilibrium wage of labour in the economy given the user
cost of capital ρ.
Recall that, given the government’s choice of user cost ρ, the equilibrium
wage solves the system of equations:
FL(Lm,K) = w (22)
FK(Lm,K) = ρ (23)
GL(Ld,D) = w (24)
Lm + Ld = 1 (25)
Let K∗(ρ, Lm) solve the ﬁrst equation and note K∗
ρ = 1/FKK and K∗
L =
−FLK/FKK. We may therefore characterize equilibrium allocation of labour
by:
FL(K∗(ρ, Lm), Lm) = GL(1− Lm)
Totally differentiating this condition gives
FLKK∗
ρdρ + (FLKK∗
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where the second equality follows from the identity π = G−wLd and (given
constant returns to scale in F and Euler’s theorem) ρK = F − wLm. 




















ρb > 0 if and only if t∗ ≤ 1/2. 
Proof of Proposition 6.
Observe ﬁrst that, for any user cost of capital ρ, social welfare is a strictly






c00(γ)(ρ − γ) + 2c0(γ) + 2t

− c00(γ)K < 0
20since c00 ≥ 0.
Evaluating (20) at γ = 0,
Ω0










and c(0) = c0(0) = 0 by assumption. At the upper threshold of the range of
binding restrictions on borrowing, ˆ γ = rb∗, c0( ˆ γ) = t, and
Ω0
γ(ρ,t, ˆ γ) = −tK < 0
Since Ω is strictly concave in γ for all ρ, it follows that 0 < γ∗ < rb∗. 
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